Bird v Jones (1845) 7 QB 742 2
Robinson v Balmain New Ferry Co [1910] AC 295 2
Willms v Kaluza [2011] DCR 62 3
Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172 at 1177 per Robert Goff LJ 3
Walker v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2015] 1 WLR 312 3
Coles Myer Limited v Webster [2009] NSWCA 299 4
Meering v Graham-White Aviation Co Ltd (1919) 122 LTR 44 4
R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, Ex p Evans [2001] 2 AC 19 5
Unlawful Restraint (i.e. no lawful justification) 5
Blundell v Attorney-General [1968] NZLR 341 5
R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, Ex p Evans [2001] 2 AC 19 7
Thompson v Attorney-General [2014] NZAR 1282 7
Coles Myer Limited v Webster [2009] NSWCA 299 9
Lecture 18: (05/05/20)
Where a person is being held in prison contrary to law.
Any unlawful form of total restraint of the plaintiff against their will.
Another form of trespass to the person is false imprisonment, which is the unlawful imposition of constraint upon another's freedom of movement from a particular place. – Collins v Wilcox [1984] 1 WLR 1172 at 1177 per Robert Goff LJ
False imprisonment is the unlawful total restraint of the liberty of a person. It may be but is not necessarily brought about by force or the threat of force… Force or the threat of force is not the gist of the cause of action… Applying again the tests of the purposes of the Accident Compensation legislation and the natural and ordinary use of language, we have come to the conclusion that false imprisonment as such is outside the purview of the Act. In ordinary speech we do not think that it would be said of anyone who had been detained as the plaintiffs claim to have been that he or she had suffered personal injury by accident. – Willis v Attorney-General [1989] 3 NZLR 574; [1990] NZAR 60
Not concerned with personal injury (ACC), but concerned with restraint.
Identifies a distinction between simply obstructing someone and total restraint.
Plaintiff had gate crashed a street party and is told that he cannot proceed up the street and must go back the way he came
Lord Denman in dissent – does not agree that it will not be a restraint just because there is means of escape.
Majority in Bird v Jones held there was no imprisonment:
“if one man compels another to stay in any given place against his will, he imprisons that other just as much as if he locked him up in a room.”
It is not necessary for someone be touched to constitute an imprisonment
Compelling someone to go in a certain direction against their will may amount to imprisonment.
Merely obstructing the passage of another leaving them with the liberty to stay or go in any other direction does not amount to imprisonment.
Plaintiff had paid a penny to go through a turnstile to catch a Ferry:
Once he gets to the other side but before he catches the ferry, he changes his mind and wants to get out the way he came in
To get out, he also had to pay a penny.
Plaintiff argued that making him pay a penny to get out was imprisonment.
Court rejected plaintiff’s claim – he had a reasonable means of escape and could have gone on the ferry in his originally intended direction.
There was no imprisonment.
Plaintiff’s wrists were tied together, under a blanket.
Having just beaten the plaintiff, three men were taunting him, telling him he could leave if he desired
Court found that plaintiff did not move – it was as if he was nailed to the spot:
Terror inspired by the three men was sufficient to operate as a restraint – plaintiff was effectively imprisoned.
Defendant (police officer) grips plaintiff’s arms to stop them from leaving:
There was total restraint, even if it was only present momentarily.
[22] Robert Goff LJ – detention can be used in more than one sense:
Requesting someone to stop and speak – not unlawful, even if the person who is stopped is influenced by the fact the stopper is a uniformed police officer with authority.
If an officer reinforces their request with the use of force or threats of force without power of arrest, this would be unlawful assault.
Here, there was no arrest – the Police woman was trying to ask questions and had grabbed hold of the complainant.
Police reacted to domestic violence call-out and had the plaintiff blocked in a doorway for 2 minutes:
There was no touching or use of force
The question was whether he was restrained
In the lower Court, the judge held that the restraint was brief and trivial because it was so short.
The English Court of Appeal held that there were no good reasons for Walker’s detention and confinement in that the police’s actions were not generally acceptable to ordinary citizens:
The Constable had positioned himself in such a way as to prevent the claimant escaping – to ensure that the claimant was not free to leave.
It is not acceptable for an ordinary citizen to interfere with a person’s liberty by confining him or her in a doorway. Although the confinement was for only a few seconds, the principle in question is framed in terms of “for however short a time”… – at [30]
Where liberty is in question, there is no room for complaisance.
Restraint need not be physical – any threatened consequences that make the plaintiff feel obliged to stay put is enough.
Court accepted that the period the complainant was restrained would have been longer if he had not tried to fight his way out:
Once he is arrested, there is no possibility of unlawful restraint.
Two men were stopped and searched by police because manager of local Kmart had falsely complained of them:
She falsely reported them for using forged or stolen credit cards
Trial judge found that the police had not arrested the two men – they had questioned them for an hour and let them go.
They were imprisoned because constraint upon their will was so great as to make them submit to deprivation of liberty – involuntary submission.
Police had approached them in a food court, plaintiffs were embarrassed and complied with police demands to be strip searched in loading bay.
Court accepted that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to be aware they are under restraint:
I think a person can be imprisoned while he is asleep, while he is in a state of drunkenness, while he is unconscious, and while he is a lunatic. Those are cases where it seems to me that the person might properly complain if he were imprisoned, though the imprisonment began and ceased while he was in that state. Of course, the damages might be diminished and would be affected by the question whether he was conscious of it or not. So a man might in fact, to my mind, be imprisoned by having the key of a door turned against him so that he is imprisoned in a room in fact although he does not know that the key has been turned. It may be that he is being detained in that room by persons who are anxious to make him believe that he is not in fact being imprisoned, and at the same time his captors outside that room may be boasting to persons that he is imprisoned, and it seems to me that if we were to take this case as an instance supposing it could be proved that Prudence had said while the plaintiff was waiting: ‘I have got him detained there waiting for the detective to come in and take him to prison’ – it appears to me that that would be evidence of imprisonment. It is quite unnecessary to go on to show that in fact the man knew that he was imprisoned. If a man can be imprisoned by having the key turned upon him without his knowledge, so he can be imprisoned if, instead of a lock and key or bolts and bars, he is prevented from, in fact, exercising his liberty by guards and warders or policemen. They serve the same purpose.”
The intention that the person is not to be free turns it into restraint.
Approved by HL in Murray v Ministry of Defence [1988] 2 All ER 521)
The tort of false imprisonment is one of strict liability.
Warden made a mistake in calculating release date, so plaintiff was kept in prison unlawfully:
The tort of false imprisonment is a tort of strict liability. But the strict theory of civil liability is not inconsistent with the fact that in certain circumstances the harm complained of may have been inflicted justifiably. This is because it is of the essence of the tort of false imprisonment that the imprisonment is without lawful justification. – at 32 per Lord Hope
The fact that it was a mistake and reasonable care had been taken is not relevant.
Section 27 Crimes Act Execution of erroneous sentence or process
If a sentence is passed or a process is issued by a court having jurisdiction under any circumstances to pass such a sentence or issue such a process, or if a warrant is issued by a court or person having jurisdiction under any circumstances to issue such a warrant, the sentence passed or process or warrant issued shall be sufficient to justify the execution of it by every officer, prison manager, or other person authorised to execute it, and by every...
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